PC 438 Christopher Houghton

Introduction

1. This is the decision of the Police Misconduct Panel convened on Monday 16^th February 2026 to consider allegations of professional misconduct brought against PC 438 Christopher Houghton.
2. The hearing was held at the Professional Standards Hearing suite at Lysander House, Tempsford, Bedfordshire. It was a public hearing.
3. The Appropriate Authority (“AA”) had made an application for two witnesses that were subject to the behaviour to be provided with anonymity. This was granted by the Chair.

 Legal and Regulatory Background.

4. The statutory and regulatory basis of the Panel lies in the Police Reform Act 2002 and the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 (“the 2020 Regulations”) as amended by the Police (Conduct) (Amendment) Rules 2024. In addition, the Panel is to have proper regard to the Statutory Guidance on Professional Standards, Performance and Integrity in Policing issued by the Home Office also issued in 2020 known as the “HOG”.

 

5. The 2020 HOG states at paragraph 1.4: “The procedures described in this guidance are designed to accord with the principles of natural justice and the basic principles of fairness. The process and procedures covered by this guidance, along with the accompanying legal framework, should be administered accordingly and applied fairly and consistently to everyone. The guidance on the individual procedures is designed to further the aims of being fair to the individual who is subject to the process, as well as all parties involved. It is intended to assist with arriving at a correct assessment of the matter in question and providing public and policing confidence in the system.

 

6. Later in the HOG the duty of the panel is summarised thus: “The persons conducting misconduct hearings will consider the facts of the case and will decide the facts (on the balance of probabilities) and whether the officer’s conduct amounted to misconduct, gross misconduct or neither.”

 

7. Having determined the facts and deciding what they amount to, the Panel is then enjoined to decide what to do about them. The Panel therefore proceeded in accordance with this basic structure.

 

8. The purpose of the Police Misconduct Regime is set out in the most recent Guidance from the College of Policing (2023) on the outcomes in such proceedings. It states at paragraph 2.3 that it is threefold, namely (1) to maintain public confidence in, and the reputation of, the police service; (2) to uphold high standards in policing and to deter misconduct; and (3) to protect the public. It is not meant to be primarily punitive, but it is accepted that misconduct proceedings can sometimes have that effect on officers involved in them.

 

9. Regulation 41 (15) of the Conduct Regulations provides that the person(s) conducting the misconduct proceedings must review the facts of the case and decide whether the conduct of the officer concerned amounts to misconduct, gross misconduct or neither.

 

 

10. Misconduct is defined as a breach of the standards of professional behaviour that is so serious as to justify disciplinary action. Gross Misconduct is defined as a breach of the standards of professional behaviour that is so serious as to justify dismissal.

 

11. In Bolton v Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 512 Lord Bingham MR said in the context of solicitor’s disciplinary proceedings that it was required of lawyers practising in the UK “that they should discharge their professional duties with integrity, probity and complete trustworthiness”. He said that the most fundamental purpose of professional disciplinary proceedings was to maintain the profession’s reputation and to “sustain public confidence in the integrity of the profession… a profession’s most valuable asset is its collective reputation and the confidence which that inspires.”

 

12. In the case of Redgrave v Metropolitan Police [2003] 1 WLR 1136, the Court of Appeal adopted Lord Diplock’s description of the purpose of disciplinary proceedings in Ziderman v General Dental Council [1976] 1 WLR 330:

 

“The purpose of disciplinary proceedings against a dentist who has been convicted of a criminal offence by a court of law is not to punish him a second time for the same offence but to protect the public who may come to him as patients and to maintain the high standards and good reputation of an honourable profession”.

 

13. In the case of R(Green) v Police Complaints Authority [2004] UKHL 6 at 78, Lord Carswell said as follows:

 

“Public confidence in the police is a factor of great importance in the maintenance of law and order in the manner which we regard as appropriate in our polity. If citizens feel that improper behaviour on the part of police officers is left unchecked and they are not held accountable for it in a suitable manner, that confidence will be eroded.”

 

14. In the case of R(Coke-Wallis) v Institute of Chartered Accountants [2011] UKSC 1 at 60, Lord Collins reaffirmed the purpose of professional disciplinary proceedings to be:

 

“…to protect the public, to maintain public confidence in the integrity of the profession and to uphold proper standards of behaviour….”

 

15. The weight to be given to personal mitigation, because of the nature and purpose of those proceedings, was discussed further in the case of Williams v Police Appeal Tribunal [2016] EWHC 2708 (Admin) at paragraph 67 where Holroyde J (as he then was) stated as follows:

 

“..the importance of maintaining public confidence in and respect for the police service is constant, regardless of the nature of the gross misconduct under consideration. What may vary will be the extent to which the particular gross misconduct threatens the preservation of such confidence and respect. The more it does so, the less weight can be given to personal mitigation.”

 

 

 

The Alleged Misconduct

 

16. The Appropriate Authority (the ‘AA’) alleged the following:

 

        Allegation 1

       

        Background facts

 

• Late in the evening on 16 or 17 September 2023 you were on duty on uniformed patrol in Watford with your then tutee constable, PC Reece Elliott.
• You were approached by an off‑duty female colleague, [Witness A], whom you knew and who disclosed that she had had her purse stolen from inside a nightclub.
• [Witness A] was off duty, had been drinking and was wearing a low‑cut top.

 

Particulars of Breach

 

• You said to [Witness A] words similar to ‘You are representing Hertfordshire police, put your tits away;’
• You then grabbed [Witness A] on her right side on her ribs under her breast and squeezed;
• You then winked at her before walking off.
• Such conduct was in breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour in relation to “Authority, Respect and Courtesy,” “Equality and Diversity” and “Discreditable Conduct.”
• Furthermore, you acted in breach of the Standard of Professional Behaviour in relation to Honesty and Integrity (the integrity limb only) in that you abused your position as a police officer as the purported justification for making the comment about [Witness A’s] breasts, inferring that you did so as some arbiter of good conduct for Hertfordshire police.

 

        Allegation 2

 

        Background facts

 

2.1   A few days later you were in the rear car park at Hatfield police station at approximately 3pm; [Witness A] and PC Reece were present.

 

Particulars of Breach

 

2.2   On seeing [Witness A] you said “It’s Miss Tits Out”;

2.3   This was said loudly enough for Witness A, PC Reece and other unknown officers nearby to have heard it;

2.4   You then hugged [Witness] A.

2.5   Such conduct was in breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour in relation to “Authority, Respect and Courtesy”, “Equality and Diversity” and “Discreditable Conduct”.

 

Allegation 3

 

Background facts

 

3.1   A few days later you saw [Witness A] in the officer at Hatfield police station towards the end of her shift.

 

Particulars of Breach

 

3.2   You asked [Witness A] if she had any plans after work, suggestively asking if she wanted some then winking at her;

3.3   As [Witness A] walked away you shouted at her “Bye Babe”, to which she made no reply;

3.4   You called [Witness A] back into the room, and when she asked what you wanted, you replied that you “just wanted to say bye again babe”

3.5   Such conduct was in breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour in relation to “Authority, Respect and Courtesy”, “Equality and Diversity” and “Discreditable Conduct”.

 

Allegation 4

 

Background facts

 

4.1   A few months later, on 14 December 2023 you were off duty when you attended Winter Wonderland in London with various colleagues, including [Witness B], a civilian investigator for Hertfordshire Police.

4.2   Over the course of the evening you and several colleagues were drinking alcohol.

4.3   You knew [Witness B]’s boyfriend, who previously worked for Hertfordshire Police.

 

Particulars of Breach

 

4.4   You told [Witness B] that you wouldn't try it on with her because you liked her boyfriend;

4.5   You grabbed [Witness B’s] s hair from behind and pulled her head back as she was dancing;

4.6   Shortly afterwards you said to her that you would have “vicious sex” with her;

4.7   A few minutes later you said that you would let her boyfriend suck you off before letting her suck you off;

4.8   Later that evening [Witness B] was waiting for colleagues outside the toilet when you approached her from behind, put your arms around her, picked her up and carried her for a few metres.

4.9   Such conduct was in breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour in relation to “Authority, Respect and Courtesy”, “Equality and Diversity” and “Discreditable Conduct”.

4.10 An aggravating feature of your conduct towards [Witness B] was that at the time you were under investigation in relation to the allegations relating to [Witness A].

 

Allegation 5

 

Background facts

 

5.1   By July 2024 you had been a police officer for some seven years and were well aware of how the CARM system worked and of the process by which you applied for and were granted leave.

 

Particulars of Breach

 

5.2   On 19 July 2024 you accessed the CARM system and would have seen the four-week roster for your upcoming duties.

5.3   The CARM system did not show you as ‘annual leave’ for the period 1–8 August 2024.

5.4   Despite that and without any appropriate authorisation you went on holiday in that period.

5.5   In doing so you deliberately ignored the process for seeking leave.

5.6   Such conduct was in breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour in relation to “Honesty and Integrity” (integrity only), “Orders and Instructions” and “Discreditable Conduct”.

5.7   An aggravating feature of such conduct was that at the time of making such a check and of going on holiday you were subject to a written warning and were under investigation for other matters addressed in allegations 1–4 above.

5.8   If proven, such allegations are considered to amount to gross misconduct in that they are so serious as to justify your dismissal.

 

List of Evidence

 

17. We considered:

 

1. The final hearing bundle of 166 pages;
2. Video footage referred to in that bundle; and
3. Character references.

 

18. We took into account all of the evidence in the bundle including the video footage, that we heard at the hearing and in the bundle of character evidence, whether we refer to it in this Record or not. We recite a summary of the key evidence on which our decisions were based.

 

19. For the avoidance of doubt, a document titled “Agreed Facts” was not considered by the panel and we put those matters from our minds.

 

Summary of Witness Evidence

 

Day 1

 

Witness A - Pryzm

 

20. [Witness A] had been off‑duty on a night out at Pryzm nightclub, wearing jeans and a slightly sheer cropped top, had consumed Malibu and coke (approx. 4–5 drinks), but stated she was “not that drunk”.

 

21. She spoke briefly to PC Reece Elliott (a student officer) about dogs. She told the Officer that her purse had been stolen. She said the Officer leaned in and whispered words to the effect of, ““Put your tits away, it’s not very Herts Police of you.” She described her reaction as laughing with awkwardness rather than amusement.

 

22. Later, during an altercation between other women nearby, she said the Officer approached, asked if she knew the girls, then grabbed her around her waist / rib area (under breast), squeezed, winked, and walked off.

 

23. She stated she did not consent to any touching.

 

24. She said that she believed that the Officer’s body-worn camera was recording at the time and raised that with PSD. She was told that nothing had been captured but was not given an explanation.

 

25. The Officer suggested to her that she was more drunk than she now claims and she accepted she had described herself as “drunk” in her original statement.

 

26. It was put to her that the Officer’s remark may have been concern for public decorum rather than sexualised. She rejected this, describing it as a misogynistic comment.

 

27. The Officer challenged the location of the alleged touching (i.e., hip vs. ribs) and she insisted it occurred between her hip and breast area and was clear in her mind that it happened.

 

28. The Officer suggested that the Officer did not wink at her and she insisted he did.

 

Witness A – Hatfield Police Station Car Park

 

29. [Witness A] said she met PC Elliott first and they spoke for five to ten minutes. The Officer then approached across the yard and shouted, “It’s Miss tits‑” The Officer then hugged her, to which she had not consented.

 

30. The Officer challenged the sequence of events, suggesting that the Officer saw her first, greeted her neutrally, and PC Elliott arrived later. She denied this.

 

31. Challenged about whether the remark had been made at all, she said that it had been said loudly and clearly.

 

Witness A – Station

 

32. [Witness A] said that she was in the report-writing area of the station. It was around midnight.

 

33. The Officer asked her if she had any plans after work and suggested that she would want some “other plans.” Her tutor overheard the exchange and warned her to be careful.

 

34. When she went to leave, the Officer said to her, “Bye babe” and then called her back. When she turned back, the Officer said “I just wanted to say bye again, babe.”

 

35. She described the comments as unwelcome and making her feel uncomfortable.

 

36. In cross-examination, it was suggested to her that the “bye again” was a typical joke used among the team. She denied that.

 

37. It was put to [Witness A] that in her written email to her sergeant about the matter, she had not named those present. She replied that she could not recall who was present or who would have heard the comment. She was firm in maintaining that the incident happened.

 

Witness A – Speaking to PC Discipline

 

38. [Witness A] said that she later related what had happened with the Officer to PC Discipline.

 

39. It was put to her that PC Discipline had warned her “he’s a family man, stay away,” which she denied.

 

40. She accepted that she may have told the Officer that she had been talking about him. He had said to her, “I hope it was all good” and she replied, “no.”

 

Day 2

 

Witness B

 

41. [Witness B] was a civilian investigator with Hertfordshire Constabulary. She had met PC Houghton once previously in a custody suite and knew of him through her boyfriend. On 14/12/2023, she attended a team Christmas event in London. She and others had been to a number of pubs, then to an event called Winter Wonderland and another pub after that.

 

42. [Witness B] and her group drank for several hours before arriving at Winter Wonderland. She described having multiple drinks but denied being drunk. Several officers, including PC Houghton, arrived later.

 

43. PC Houghton seemed “happy,” possibly drunk. They spoke about her boyfriend. PC Houghton talked positively about her boyfriend, saying he liked him and felt sorry about his leaving the Constabulary. She recalled him saying words to the effect: “You’re beautiful” and “I wouldn’t try it on with you because I like your boyfriend.”

 

44. While standing and facing the stage, [Witness B] felt someone grab her hair at the roots and pull her head backward. She did not see the person do it. She turned and saw PC Houghton behind her, looking at her, smiling,” and said he was the only person directly behind her. She accepted that she did not physically see the hand but said she believed it was him. In cross examination, she conceded that it could have been someone else but was certain from what she saw that it was not.

 

45. [Witness B] stated Houghton said “I'd have vicious sex with you.” She was 100% confident those were his words. She challenged him by asking “What?” and he seemed to brush it off.

 

46. [Witness B] stated that Houghton then said, “I would let your boyfriend suck me off before I let you suck me off.” She found that completely unwelcome.

 

47. [Witness B] said that as they were leaving PC Houghton came from behind, put his arms around her, lifted her up and carried her several metres. She said she recognised him because his face was next to hers during the lift. In cross-examination, it was suggested the lift did not happen, or that it may have been someone else, demonstrating footage where colleagues were lifting each other in a playful manner. She denied any confusion and insisted it was PC Houghton.

 

48. Messages between her and her boyfriend at around 21:36 – 22:57 showed a photo of her and PC Houghton taken on her phone. She accepted that in the messages she made positive references of PC Houghton liking her boyfriend and made no mention, at that time, of hair‑pulling or sexual comments. She had not wanted to talk about it at the time.

 

PC Sophie Discipline

 

49. PC Discipline knew both [Witness A] and PC Houghton from Hatfield Police Station. She said [Witness A] as someone who disclosed too much personal information, sometimes exaggerated, created “drama” and whose stories tended to change. She had raised her concerns with a number of sergeants.

 

50. [Witness A] told her that PC Houghton had touched her hip/side in a nightclub while on duty, and said words like “put your boobs away.”

 

51. [Witness A] did not seem particularly bothered by the allegations as she relayed them. PC Discipline asked whether his body‑worn camera was recording; Witness A said yes. Discipline became concerned that the allegation could later be exaggerated or misrepresented.

 

52. Later, she told PC Houghton to stay away from [Witness A]. She did so because she feared [Witness A] might create problems or misrepresent events. She stated he appeared confused and did not seem to know what she was talking about; the exchange was fleeting.

 

Day 3

 

PC Houghton

 

53. PC Houghton began by outlining his policing background. He joined Hertfordshire Police in July 2017 and, by September 2023, he was a response officer at Hatfield with responsibility for tutoring a probationary constable, PC Elliott.

 

54. PC Houghton described the tutor–student dynamic as one where the junior officer would ordinarily remain close, except when operational realities demanded temporary separation. His prior acquaintance with Witness A was limited to four or five short conversations at the police station, during which, he said, she tended to disclose highly personal matters in disproportionate detail.

 

55. Regarding the alleged events outside Pryzm nightclub in Watford, PC Houghton recalled that he and PC Elliott were stationed there for public‑order duties, a routine part of policing the town’s busy Saturday night economy.

 

56. [Witness A] approached them in the early hours, clearly intoxicated but in good spirits. As she spoke about having left a holiday early and being without her friends, he noticed that her top was revealing. He accepted that he quietly told her words to the effect of “Can you cover up your breasts? We are representing Hertfordshire Police.”

 

57. PC Houghton’s explanation was that he wished to prevent their interaction from being misconstrued by members of the public, particularly given that people in such environments frequently filmed police. He emphasised repeatedly that he was trying to safeguard both officers and [Witness A], not to police her choice of clothing. He denied speaking these words in a whisper, saying instead that he merely lowered his tone so as not to draw attention. He further stated that Witness A laughed and made a light‑hearted gesture afterwards, before continuing her conversation about job‑related concerns.

 

58. PC Houghton denied the further allegation that he touched or grabbed [Witness A] below the breast, insisting that no physical contact took place at any point in the exchange.

 

59. PC Houghton said that the conversation was brief and uneventful, after which he saw her intermittently as she involved herself, sometimes uninvited, in incidents unfolding nearby, such as reporting a fight or handing him a paramedic’s phone to return. He said that on each such occasion she remained intoxicated but upbeat, and that he and his student officer continued their duties in the ordinary way.

 

60. On the later allegation that he had greeted [Witness A] at Hatfield Police Station with the phrase “Miss Tits Out” the officer denied using such wording. He accepted that he may have said something like “There she is” in a light‑hearted routine greeting he also used with other colleagues but insisted that any sexualised phrasing alleged by Witness A was untrue.

 

61. PC Houghton also denied hugging her, explaining that although colleagues did sometimes hug socially, he did not recall doing so here and was clear that nothing inappropriate occurred. He said that the brief conversation concerned her finishing her shift early and being tired, and that she told him she had been given permission to leave by a supervising sergeant. He described the encounter as fleeting, lasting only about a minute, and occurring as they passed one another in opposing directions.

 

62. He also rejected any suggestion that he had made suggestive or sexual comments to her, such as asking whether she had plans after work or inviting her to “do something,” and equally denied ever calling her “babe.”

 

63. When the questioning moved to the Winter Wonderland allegations raised by [Witness B], PC Houghton provided a detailed account of his movements and interactions that day. He explained that he travelled to London on the afternoon of 14 December 2023 with various colleagues, arrived at the Barrel Vault pub in Kings Cross at around 4:00 to 4:30 p.m., and had one or two drinks while feeling nervous about attending due to being under active investigation.

 

64. PC Houghton said that he then accompanied the group to Winter Wonderland, where he estimated that he had a further four or five drinks by around 8:30 p.m. He described assisting a younger colleague, PC Stewart, who became severely drunk, to the extent of vomiting and passing out, and explained how he contacted the officer’s family, charged his phone, spoke to relatives, and escorted him to a meeting point where his sister collected him.

 

65. After returning to the Bavarian Village area, PC Houghton found that officers from St Albans had joined his group and that [Witness B] and her colleague were also present. He accepted that he spoke to [Witness B] on the dance floor and that the footage shown to the panel accurately captured him leaning into her ear in order to be heard over the loud music. He said their conversation lasted roughly ten to fifteen minutes, forming one largely continuous interaction broken only by movement in the crowded space. He stated repeatedly that the discussion centred almost entirely on her partner, whom he knew from playing football in 2014/15 and from later interactions at work. He said they talked about her boyfriend’s current work, his attempts to join the police, his earlier issues, and how well he and Houghton had historically got on. He accepted praising her boyfriend as a “nice guy” or “good‑looking lad,” though denied using the word “beautiful” and denied making any comments about [Witness B’s] own appearance.

 

66. He acknowledged that a photograph was taken of the two of them at [Witness B’s] request so she could send it to her boyfriend, and he identified the reply “Thanks Chrissy xxx” as a reference to his football nickname. He confirmed that after their conversation ended, he went to the bar in an attempt to order a drink, but found it had closed at 10:00 p.m. When he returned, his own team had dispersed, as had [Witness B’s] group. He did not see her again that night.

 

67. PC Houghton denied all four particulars of [Witness B’s] allegations. He stated he did not grab her hair, did not pull her head backwards, and did not lift or carry her. He rejected entirely the suggestion that he whispered or stated that he would have “vicious sex” with her and likewise denied ever having said that he would allow her boyfriend to perform a sexual act on him before allowing her to do so. He maintained that he did not make any sexual comment of any kind. When asked whether he could offer any explanation as to why [Witness B] would make such allegations, he said he could not and did not suggest she had fabricated them for any motive known to him.

 

68. Finally, PC Houghton addressed the allegation relating to leave taken in August 2024 without proper authorisation. He explained that the CARM system was ordinarily used to submit annual leave requests, and that in his previous intervention‑team role he was accustomed to monitoring staffing levels closely to ensure leave could be granted. However, after being placed on restricted, home‑based duties during the investigation, he said he no longer routinely checked CARM because he was disengaged from day‑to‑day team scheduling.

 

69. PC Houghton described the first half of 2024 as a period of acute stress marked by anxiety, insomnia, marital difficulties, and professional isolation. He believed, incorrectly, that he had booked his holiday through his phone app. The audit logs showed he had accessed CARM on 19 July, but he stated he must have been checking courses or team movement rather than his own leave entries. He maintained that the failure to obtain authorisation for the week in August was a genuine mistake, discovered only when a neighbour alerted him, after which he immediately contacted his sergeant, apologised, and accepted responsibility. He rejected the suggestion that he knowingly absented himself or sought to evade scrutiny.

 

Findings of Fact

 

Allegation 1

 

70. We considered this allegation in parts as set out in the Regulation 30 Notice (the “ 30”).

 

• This paragraph commenced the background facts to the allegation. This fact was proved and, on the evidence, we were satisfied that the facts were established.

 

• The comment that [Witness A] had lost her purse was outlined by her in her evidence. PC Elliott heard it as well. The Officer says that he did not hear it, though we understand that he does not positively assert that it was not said.

 

We regarded it as a detail that would be unusual to fabricate or misremember. Both [Witness A] and PC Elliott recalled it independently. We found no reason to doubt the assertion and we found it proved as a matter of fact.

 

We regarded the fact that the Officer did not hear it as a useful conclusion for other parts of Allegation 1. It followed that we could not be satisfied that the Officer and PC Elliott were so glued together that they must have heard the same things at all times. In the kind of situation they were in, we recognise that attention is diverted easily from moment to moment.

 

• This was also not disputed by the Officer and we accepted it as a fact.

 

We did note that PC Elliott said in his evidence that he did not take any particular note of how [Witness A] was dressed until the Officer drew his attention to the matter. We regarded that as relevant: Witness A was not dressed unusually for the circumstances.

 

• This is the first element of the particulars of breach; that Officer said to Witness A words to the effect that she was representing Hertfordshire Police and to put her breasts (“tits” or “boobs”) “away.” this was admitted in terms by the Officer, though he said at all stages that he intended no offence but had in mind that two uniformed officers speaking on familiar terms to [Witness A], while she was dressed as she was, would cause some form of harm to the service.

 

• This was the first contested part of the particulars of breach. It was alleged by [Witness A] that the Officer grabbed her by the waist or her ribs, under her breast. The Officer flatly denies this part of the allegation.

 

In evidence, [Witness A] was not entirely clear about where on her body she said that the Officer had touched her and she appeared to have confused left with right. These discrepancies did not greatly trouble us. Details of that type can be difficult to recall with great clarity. In particular, some people have particular difficulty with left and right. In the context of describing a body part, [Witness A] said that she was wearing high-waisted leggings and that could serve to confuse what part of her body she was trying to describe.

 

[Witness A] accepted that she was drunk. We accept that this may have affected her recall and may serve to undermine her reliability. On the other hand, it could also explain vagueness or confusion about the area of her body she said had been touched.

 

It was also relevant to our consideration that when she reported the matter to PC Discipline, PC Discipline was concerned for her. Likewise, [Witness A] reported the matter to her sergeant. She did not want to cause trouble for the Officer but wanted the issue to be on record. It is not an easy thing to do, to inform on a colleague in that way. These factors tended to support Witness A’s credibility and reliability.

 

On the other hand, PC Discipline also had concerns about the integrity of [Witness A. She regarded Witness A. as prone to exaggeration and was someone she would not want on the team.

 

PC Elliott did not see this alleged act happen.

 

We did not find that [Witness A’s] demeanour revealed anything on which we could rely.

 

We found that the factors supporting and undermining [Witness A’s] evidence were somewhat balanced. Taking all the factors into account, we concluded that the AA had failed to establish this part of the allegation to the required standard and we found that it did not happen as a matter of fact.

 

• This is the allegation that the Officer winked at [Witness A]. For the same reasons as for 1.5 above, we find that this did not happen.

 

71. We find allegation 1 (1.4 to 1.6) proved but only to the extent that the Officer told [Witness A] to put “away” her breasts because she was representing Hertfordshire Police.

 

72. When the Officer gave evidence about the reason for responding as he did, his rationale was very vague and badly formed; the Officer very much struggled to pin down exactly what harm he foresaw. We considered whether this impacted on our assessment of his motivation. We noted that he referenced Hertfordshire Police and the most direct indication was that he did have some concern about the reputation of the service. We accept that his intention was genuine but instinctive, rather than well thought-through.

 

73. We also note that officers are told on a regular basis that they represent the service and to think about their image. We accept that this may have played a part in the Officer’s thinking.

 

74. On the other hand, [Witness A] said that she felt the comment was misogynistic. Against that, Mr McCartney, on behalf of the Officer, suggested that a similar situation would be alerting a man to his fly being open or his trousers falling down. We rejected that comparison.

 

75. [Witness A] chose her clothing and how revealing it was. A man with his trousers falling down is suffering from what is now known as a “wardrobe malfunction.” They are not the same at all. The comment (made by the officer) was rude and ill-conceived. In effect, the Officer sought to police [Witness A’s] modesty. That is clearly inappropriate.

 

76. Thinking about the type of harm that the Officer appeared to have been concerned about, we considered police policy and guidance. Nothing in the guidance or policy suggested that [Witness A] should not dress as she did while off duty (especially in a nightclub).

 

77. The Officer referenced people seeing two male officers in uniform being in friendly conversation with a woman in revealing dress. Perhaps what he had in mind (even if the thought was not very well-formed) was social media posting. If an image was published, at worst, it might be unwelcome social media attention for the service. It would certainly not be something of actual concern.

 

78. Having set out what we concluded the evidence established as to the Officer’s motivation, we turned to seriousness, having regard to the Code of Ethics.

 

• We noted that the Officer was not respectful, failed to exercise self-restraint in his language and sought to impose his own sense of propriety on Witness A. We found that the standard of “Authority, respect and courtesy” was engaged and a breach proved in respect of respect and courtesy.

 

We did not regard that the Officer’s conduct was of a type that was envisaged by the standard of “Equality and diversity.” We were not able to conclude that the Officer acted as he did because [Witness A] is a woman. Although we rejected Mr McCartney’s examples, we concluded that the evidence could not establish that the Officer would not have been equally insensitive to a man who had dressed (in his view) inappropriately.

 

Having found that the Officer was well-intentioned and that he was ill-advised, we also concluded that a civilian bystander would have been concerned to hear an officer speak to an off-duty police officer in the way that he did. It could give the impression of an officer with a negative attitude to women and that could cause harm to the service’s reputation. We found the standard of “Discreditable conduct” engaged and a breach proved.

 

• It follows from our conclusions that we did not find the standard of “Honesty and integrity” to have been engaged.

 

Allegation 1 - Seriousness

 

79. At this stage, we reference the Guidance on Outcomes only to assess overall seriousness. We have yet to hear submissions and our assessment may change, including increasing or decreasing in assessment of seriousness. Our findings at this stage are, necessarily, provisional.

 

80. Culpability denotes the officer’s blameworthiness or responsibility for their actions. The more culpable or blameworthy the behaviour in question, the more serious the misconduct and the more severe the likely outcome.

 

81. The harm was unintended but was reasonably foreseeable.

 

82. The Officer was tutoring a tutee at the time.

 

83. We did not find sexual impropriety (matters of modesty are distinguishable from sexual impropriety). Likewise, we did not regard this as a matter relating to violence against women and girls (‘VAWG’).

 

84. The harm in this case was potential distress to [Witness A] (who did not appear to have experienced distress) and potential reputational harm to the service. We note that it does not matter that the public did not in fact observe the behaviour or that the harm did not come about. Police attitudes to women are perceived as an issue of national concern and the Officer’s conduct (without intending to have done so) could have undermined the service in that important area of public concern.

 

85. We found no aggravating features.

 

86. For mitigating features (of this allegation in isolation) we found that it was an isolated incident, limited in extent, conduct pursuant to a perceived legitimate interest (although the Officer got it wrong, as well as being rude in delivery) and open admissions were made (we found as proved only those matters admitted by the Officer).

 

87. For allegation 1 in isolation, we found low culpability and medium harm.

 

88. We concluded that the conduct was serious enough to justify disciplinary action but not so serious that dismissal without notice was justified. We found misconduct only.

 

Allegation 2

 

Submissions and findings on “material averments”

 

89. The Reg 30 pleaded (under the header “Background facts”) that the alleged breach took place, “A few days later… in the car park at Hatfield police station at approximately 3pm…”

 

90. The evidence of the Officer was that the incident was in the car park but at between 11:00 to 11:30 p.m., as he was walking back to the police station.

 

91. Witness A said the incident was in the car park (or “yard”) at approximately 11:30 p.m.

 

92. PC Elliott said that it occurred at 3:00 p.m. in the ballroom as he and the Officer were going in and [Witness A] was coming out.

 

93. In closing submissions, Mr McCartney suggested that we could not find allegation 2 proved because the time and place were material to the allegation and the evidence was inconsistent with the allegation as pleaded by the AA.

 

94. Our legally qualified adviser (‘LQA’) gave final advice (to paraphrase) that we should determine the facts and then determine whether the facts proved amounted to a breach of the standards. Neither counsel commented on that advice. In effect, the LQA’s advice was contradictory to Mr McCartney’s point but did not address it directly.

 

95. During retirement, we asked our LQA for further advice on the materiality of time and place. Before giving any further advice, the LQA notified counsel of the request and counsel asked to make representations. We paused any consideration about the evidence in relation to allegation 2 overnight, pending submissions. Overnight, it was then agreed between the parties and the panel that we would resume earlier than scheduled for counsel to make oral submissions.

 

96. In oral submissions, we were referred to Dossi, ^[1] Pritchett ^[2] and Robson. ^[3] In summary, the case law establishes that:

 

1. If time and place are material to the allegation, the AA cannot advance its case without amendment and it may be unlawful to allow such an amendment.

 

1. If the AA deviates from its pleaded case on a factually material point, the Officer may be prejudiced because he may not understand the case he is expected to answer.

 

97. Mr McCartney repeated his points and expanded on them. Mr McCartney’s points were essentially twofold:

 

1. The time and place averred by the AA were material to the allegation. It was not open to the panel to determine that things had been said and done and then work backwards and conclude that the time and / or place did not matter and the effect of that would be to reverse the burden of proof. Though it is open to the panel to find some facts alleged as proved but not others (as we have done for allegation 1), he suggested that it is not open to the panel to re-write the pleaded case to meet the evidence.

 

1. That the difference was so significant that the Officer could not be expected to understand the case he had to answer. As an example, had the AA pleaded a different time and place, he would have been able to look for further evidence.

 

98. In response Mr Landau said that it would be absurd for the panel to find as a fact that the Officer had breached the standards but find itself barred from making a finding of misconduct on such an insignificant point as when it happened or where.

 

99. We considered first of all whether we regarded time and place to be material to the allegation. An example given by Mr Landau was that there cannot be burglary without trespass. In that sense, the time and place is clearly not a material averment. In the case of burglary, in the criminal courts, the prosecution must prove trespass. In these proceedings, no standard contains an element of time. None of the standards refer to a place (though the Guidance on Outcomes refers to the workplace as being relevant to seriousness in some instances). It follows that time and place is not an element of the “offence” to be proved.

 

100. The case law establishes that time and place may be material averments in other ways. One example is in the case of certain sexual offences, when the age of the alleged victim is an element of the offence charged (e.g., the victim being a child under a certain age).

 

101. We find that this is not such a case. The time and place is simply not material to the allegation.

 

102. We also do not accept Mr McCartney’s point that we would be working backwards or changing the burden of proof if we found as a fact that words were said but concluded that when they were said did not matter.

 

103. First, we find the facts. Then, we consider whether those facts as proved amount to a breach.

 

104. Of course, if in our deliberations, we begin to see that evidence may lead us to a point that has not been answered, as a minimum, the parties must have an opportunity to address on that but that is not the case here.

 

105. The most important question for us was whether the Officer can have a fair hearing. There is a discrepancy between the evidence and the case pleaded by the AA. Could that mean that the Officer does not know the case that he has to answer?

 

106. To answer that question, we turned to the procedural history of this case.

 

107. The Officer was first alerted to the allegation on 04/10/23 in the Regulation 17 notice (‘Reg 17’) (at 29). There it was stated that, “… following the 16^{th of} September 2023 you have seen [Witness A] on duty and yelled to her ‘ITS MISS TITS OUT’ and you then hugged her.” [sic]

 

108. The Officer responded to the Reg 17 (at 37). His response was:

 

“I cannot remember the exact date I next saw [Witness A] on duty, but I do recall crossing over with her as she was leaving HATFIELD POLICE STATION at the conclusion of her shift and PC ELLIOTT and I were returning from an incident we had attended at the beginning of our shift. I believe this is likely to be 25/09/2023. I remember speaking to [Witness A] briefly as I was walking back towards the police station but deny saying “IT’S MISS TITS OUT” and I do not recall giving [Witness A] a hug. PC ELLIOTT and I chatted with [Witness A] briefly before she left. [Witness A] seemed to be in an upbeat mood openly speaking with PC ELLIOTT and I before [Witness A] then stated to us “I’M GOING HOME TO BED” to which I replied “OF COURSE YOU ARE. WHAT ELSE WOULD YOU DO. IT’S LATE” before she walked away and PC ELLIOTT and I entered the police station to continue our tour of duty.” [sic]

 

109. The Reg 17 was re-assessed (at 61) following the emergence of allegation 4. The Officer did not change his response in respect of allegation 2 save that he was more definite about not hugging [Witness A], stating that he did not think that he had ever hugged her.

 

110. It was in the Reg 30 (at 143) that the AA chose to pin its colours to the mast and 3:00 p.m. and the car park were averred. The Officer responded to that (at 158):

 

“PC Houghton accepts that he saw [Witness A] outside Hatfield police station approximately 9 to 12 days later after they had spoken in Watford town centre. PC Houghton recollects this was when he returned to Hatfield Police Station with PC Elliott during a night shift. It is denied that he said, ‘there she is tits out girl’ (or any similar words) and that he hugged her. PC Houghton believes that PC Elliott was some distance away, near the police vehicle, when he saw [Witness A] and it is therefore unlikely that he heard anything that was said.

 

“PC Houghton denies:

 

• That he used the words alleged.
• That he hugged [Witness A].
• That he behaved inappropriately with [Witness A].
• As a result, it is denied that he breached the standards as alleged.” [sic]

 

111. The AA first put its case to the Officer in wide terms. He knew what incident was in question.

 

112. The AA then narrowed its case, arguably pinning the wrong colours to the mast, and the Officer still knew the incident concerned.

 

113. The Officer’s evidence is that he remembers the incident. Indeed, as the case developed, the Officer expanded on his account.

 

114. We are satisfied that the Officer and the witnesses are all talking about the same incident. There has never been a suggestion that any one of them may have been talking about a different incident. Knowing what incident was in question, the Officer knew what evidence he could secure if he chose to – he has lost no opportunity to gather evidence.

 

115. We conclude that the Officer has not suffered any prejudice.

 

Allegation 2 – Findings of fact

 

116. We also address the allegation point by point.

 

2.1   The Officer admits the facts suggested but disagrees with the time.

 

2.2   Witness A gave evidence about what she says she heard the Officer say and those words were heard by PC Elliott.

 

        The Officer also recalled the incident. He accepts that he said something like, “Oh, there she is” which is a greeting he uses frequently.

 

        There is a clear discrepancy about when and where the alleged incident happened. It was PC Elliott who gave evidence different to that of the Officer and [Witness A]. We considered whether PC Elliott’s credibility or reliability was undermined by the discrepancy. We note that shifts can blend into one another and days likewise. PC Elliott said that what stood out to him was the words. We conclude that in the context of the routine of coming onto shift and off from shift, it is not remarkable that a witness may think that something happened at a different time or a different place. We regarded it as the type of honest mistake an honest and reliable witness might make.

 

        In terms of time and place the Officer and [Witness A] are in broad agreement and, the extent that it is of any significance, we find as a fact that the incident happened at around 11:00 to 11:30 p.m. and in the car park of Hatfield police station.

 

        The Officer said that he thought that PC Elliott was too far away to hear what he said. However, PC Elliott does recall the words and they match what [Witness A] recalled. There has been no suggestion of collusion. We find it difficult to accept that PC Elliott and [Witness A] could both be completely mistaken but yet arrive at such a similar form of words as they independently recalled.

 

        Further, we have already commented on the fact that it is no trivial matter for a tutee to speak out against his tutor.

 

        We have already commented on the difficulty we had with the credibility of [Witness A]. However, given our conclusions about what both she and PC Elliott independently recalled, we are satisfied to the relevant standard that Witness A’s account about what was said to her by the Officer is true and accurate.

 

2.3   We have concluded that what was said must have been audible to PC Elliott.

 

2.4   In contrast to what was said by [Witness A], PC Elliott did not witness the Officer hugging [Witness A]. Given that PC Elliott spoke out about the Officer’s comments, we are satisfied that if he had seen the Officer hug Witness A, he would have said so.

 

        Taking into account everything we have already said about Witness A’s credibility, in the absence of corroboration, we conclude that that AA has not established this alleged fact to the relevant standard. We find as a fact that the Officer did not hug [Witness A].

 

2.5   We conclude that the comment, “It’s Miss tits out” is clearly offensive and discourteous. It is the kind of language that could cause upset or distress and is completely inappropriate in the workplace. All officers and employees of the force are entitled to be treated with dignity The standard of “Authority, respect and courtesy” is engaged and we find that the Officer was in breach of the standard in terms of respect and courtesy.

 

        For reasons we have already set out, we did not regard this as a case that was intended for the standard of “Equality and Diversity.”

 

        We concluded that if a member of the public head heard or became aware of the comment, the service would be brought into disrepute. The comment also served to undermine the Officer’s own reputation. The standard of “Discreditable conduct” is engaged and the Officer was in breach of that standard.

 

117. In terms of culpability, we found that the Officer’s conduct was intentional. Further, the Officer was a tutor and the comment was made in the presence of his tutee.

 

118. Turning to harm, we noted that [Witness A] did not appear to have been especially affected. However, another person could well have been. There is harm in the potential damage to reputation to the service. Police attitudes to women are a matter of national concern. The comment could have a negative impact on other officers and employees of the service, particularly those who are not male.

 

119. We found no aggravating features.

 

120. In isolation, we found this allegation to have been a “one off” and limited in scope.

 

121. We concluded that culpability and harm were both medium.

 

122. We found this allegation to have been more serious than allegation 1, because it did not have the (misguided) justification present in our findings in respect of allegation 1. However, the allegation is not so serious as to lift it into the territory of justifying immediate dismissal without notice. We found misconduct only.

 

Allegation 3

 

123. We considered this allegation in the round.

 

124. We have already touched on elements that help [Witness A’s] credibility and reliability (for example, making a report to her sergeant) and that work against her (for example, PC Discipline’s concerns about her).

 

125. For reasons already expressed, we found that the AA had not established the facts underlying this allegation to the required standard, save to the extent that the Officer made admissions.

 

126. It follows that we concluded that the Officer said “bye” to [Witness A], called her back only to say “bye” again.

 

127. We accepted that this was an “in joke” in the station at the time. We conclude that it was immature and less than professional but not a matter for disciplinary action or reflective practice.

 

128. We found no standard engaged and no breach of any standard proved.

 

Allegation 4

 

129. For this allegation, we again address the individual elements of the Reg. 30, though not quite in order.

 

4.1   The Officer admitted attending Winter Wonderland as alleged.

 

4.2   The Officer accepted drinking. We accept his evidence of having consumed about six pints of beer. We conclude that he was at least somewhat drunk.

 

4.3   The Officer accepted knowing [Witness B’s] boyfriend.

 

4.4   This is the beginning of the particulars of the breach or the allegation proper. [Witness B] says that the Officer said to her that he would not “try it on” with her because he liked her boyfriend.

 

        We note that [Witness B] made a contemporaneous note of the exchange by way of a WhatsApp message to her boyfriend. That supported her credibility.

 

        The Officer suggested that the comment was inconsistent with a happy photograph of her and the Officer. We did not find that persuasive. Firstly, [Witness B] did not seem to have been overly concerned about the comment. Secondly, people will respond in different ways to a threat (including an awkward exchange) and it is trite that those ways include “fight,” “flight,” *freeze,” “friend” and “flop.”

 

        We considered that [Witness B] had no reason to make up the alleged statement (and to be fair to the Officer, he did not suggest it).

       

        On behalf of the Officer, Mr McCartney emphasised that [Witness B] had a remarkable lack of memory about certain things, such as when she caught the train and how much and what she had drunk. We found little favour with that point. Those things are of a type that would not be unusual not to recall and certainly of a very different type of thing to an unusual exchange of words with a relatively unfamiliar person.

 

        We also concluded that the risk of mishearing in a loud environment could be discounted. We could see on the video evidence that the Officer leant close to [Witness B], as though speaking directly into her ear.

 

        We also had in mind that criticising her boyfriend’s friend to her boyfriend would not be a trivial matter.

 

        We concluded that the comment was consistent with an attempt at flirtation and that it was a plausible thing for the Officer to have done.

 

        We concluded that the contemporaneous evidence supported [Witness B] and concluded that she was credible and reliable. We accepted her evidence and rejected the evidence of the Officer.

 

4.5   We turned to this alleged fact next. It is clear from the evidence that colleagues picking one another up happened and the Officer did not suggest that [Witness B] was not picked up. Rather, he sought to suggest that [Witness B] was mistaken about who picked her up.

 

        [Witness B] was cross-examined at length about relative body position, head position, direction of faces and so on. She maintained her account that she saw the Officer pick her up.

 

        [Witness B] is a slight person. Most of us, if not all, have experience of lifting a child. We do not seek to compare [Witness B] with a child – the relevance is that of picking-up someone smaller than oneself. We consider that it would be unusual for someone to be picked up and not know who had done it.

 

        On this point, we found the Officer’s case to be implausible. Even taking into account Witness B’s drunkenness, we accepted [Witness B] as credible and reliable. And we accepted her evidence.

 

4.6   We turned back to considering the issues in sequence, having dealt with the aspects of this allegation that the panel concluded were more straightforward.

 

        In regard to this element of the allegation, the Officer likewise suggested that Witness B had got the wrong person.

 

        We had regard to the fact that when one experiences something like one’s hair being pulled, one’s instinct is to immediately turn on the spot. We accept in the circumstances that [Witness B] would have been able to, and did, capture enough information about the immediate circumstances to reach a reliable conclusion about who had pulled her hair.

 

        For reasons similar to those that we have already set out, we accept her evidence and reject the Officer’s.

 

4.7   At this point, we are in the territory of the word of one against the other. We have already found [Witness B] credible and reliable on all points and the Officer on none. For that reason, we continue to accept [Witness B’s] evidence and find this fact proved on the balance of probabilities.

 

4.8   For the same reasons, we find that this fact is proved.

       

130. We find allegation 4 (4.4 to 4.8) proved in full.

 

131. We considered allegation 4 in the round. Our understanding of the evidence was not that the Officer followed [Witness B] around throughout the evening, rather that they encountered each other from time-to-time throughout the evening.

 

132. We considered what the Officer said and did in the context of everyone being in drink, others participating in boisterous behaviour and a general air of festivity and the team letting their hair down. In that context, we concluded that the Officer was making attempts at flirtation with [Witness B]. His efforts escalated.

 

133. We noted that [Witness B] did not seem to positively discourage the Officer (though we do not suggest for a moment that any woman has any duty to make it plain that she does not want to be the subject of advances). Instead, she chose to reject the Officer’s advances by ignoring them. It is in that context that the Officer’s advances escalated.

 

134. We were deeply concerned about the expression of “vicious sex.” In the context of increasingly violent pornography, we took some time to determine whether the Officer had meant something malicious by that. Significantly, the evidence did not really help us to understand how the words were said. The most evidence we had on that was that Officer described as being said in a “weird” way. It followed that there was no evidence of aggressive intent.

 

135. For that reason, we concluded that the evidence proved no more than persistent flirtation that escalated to include language that could be taken in a highly offensive way or even have caused considerable distress to someone of a different disposition to [Witness B].

 

136. We note that the conduct was off duty, although a “work do” is an extension of the workplace. This was not “on duty” conduct but conduct of a type that could impact on workplace dynamics.

 

137. We also note that officers are entitled to a private life. This panel is not concerned with morality and, for the avoidance of doubt, we do not regard that the Officer was flirting (to an extent inappropriately) with someone with a partner as matter that concerns us or Hertfordshire Police.

 

138. Having set out our conclusions on the context, we turned to seriousness.

 

4.9   We conclude that although the Officer sought to engage in flirtation, he crossed a line with a colleague and at a work party. He was discourteous and offensive to a colleague. We found that the standard of “Authority, respect and courtesy” was engaged and the standard breached in terms of respect and courtesy.

 

        For reasons expressed previously, we did not regard this as a case that engaged the standard of “Equality and diversity.” [Witness B] was not the subject of the conduct because she was a woman but because she was someone to whom the Officer was attracted.

 

        It did not appear to us that [Witness B] was distressed by what occurred. However, it is not a stretch to see how someone told that they would experience “vicious sex” would find that as deeply distressing. It could even be seen as a threat.

 

Likewise, speaking of acts of fellatio with a relatively unfamiliar person and acts of fellatio with one’s partner would be deeply offensive to many people.

 

The risk of harm was significant and foreseeable, though we accept that the Officer did not intend to cause harm and did not cause harm in fact.

 

We conclude that the standard of “Discreditable conduct” is engaged and a breach is proved.

 

Allegation 4 - Seriousness

 

139. In terms of culpability, we found that the Officer’s actions were deliberate.

 

140. For the avoidance of doubt, we mention this only because it was raised by the AA – we found no criminal conduct. As a matter of law, a hair pull or picking someone up without consent could amount to an assault by battery. However, in context, there would be clear and arguable defences of implied consent. We do not understand that the AA formally suggest criminal conduct and if that were suggested, we would reject it.

 

141. Again, for the avoidance of doubt, we did not consider that any of the features of culpability under the heading of VAWG were present and likewise, none of the features of “Violence, intimidation or sexual impropriety.”

 

142. In addressing our overall view of the Officer’s motivation, we have addressed the issue of harm. In this case, no significant actual harm arose. The risk of harm was twofold – that another subject of the conduct could easily have been distressed or even threatened we have already addressed. We also conclude that a member of the public observing a male officer suggesting “vicious sex” to an unconsenting female officer (even off duty) would be concerned about the officer’s attitude to women and that could reflect on the service.

 

143. In terms of aggravating features, we noted the language that could be described as degrading. However, we have already taken that into account in assessing the conduct as crossing the line into misconduct in the first place. We did not regard this as an aggravating feature.

 

144. We did regard it as an aggravating feature that at the time, the Officer was under investigation on other matters (of a different nature but with a small number of similar features).

 

145. We found no mitigating factors relating to the allegation.

 

146. We found culpability to be medium but uplifted to somewhere between medium and high as a result of the aggravating feature of being under investigation for other matters. We found the level of harm to be medium.

 

147. In isolation, we concluded that this matter is too serious for reflective practice but not so serious as to justify immediate dismissal without notice. We find misconduct only.

 

Allegation 5

 

148. We deal with this allegation in a broad way.

 

149. The Officer accepted that he failed to request annual leave before going to a holiday destination.

 

150. There are cases where it is apparent that conduct, if proven, must have been deliberate. We conclude that this is not such a case. For that reason, we looked for evidence that the Officer had acted deliberately. We were not able to find any.

 

151. We likewise looked at whether we could draw any safe inference that the Officer had acted deliberately. We found that simply forgetting, planning to do it later and then forgetting and deliberate failure were all inherently plausible. It followed that we could make no safe inference.

 

152. We accept as a fact that the Officer made a genuine mistake.

 

153. That in itself is a breach of the standard of “Orders and instructions,” but no other standard is engaged. The holiday and rota system is a vital management tool. We reject the suggestion that an inadvertent failure is not a breach of the standard. Important consequences can follow, such as calculating pay and allocation of resources.

 

154. However, we also do not regard the breach as a matter requiring disciplinary action. It is a breach that is proportionately dealt with by reflective practice.

 

Seriousness – allegations 1 and 2 together

 

155. We considered allegations 1 and 2 in aggregate first, because they arguably form a pattern. They both concerned Witness A and both related to the same underlying incident of her wearing revealing clothes at Pryzm nightclub.

 

156. Taken together, the two allegations must be more serious. However, taking into account the limited findings of fact established by the evidence, we remain of the view that immediate dismissal without notice is not justified.

 

Seriousness of all allegations together

 

157. We found allegations 1 and 2 proved on limited bases. Allegation 3 was not proved. Allegation 4 was proved in full. Allegation 5 was proved to the extent of innocent mistake but nevertheless, a breach of the standards.

 

158. Taking allegations 1, 2 and 4 together, we note that they were separated in time by some months. Both involved women but there is no suggestion of sexual impropriety. Allegations 1 and 2 were not sexual but expression of disapproval of perceived immodesty. Allegation 4 amounted to inappropriate flirting.

 

159. The Officer was at risk of reputational harm and likewise causing reputational harm to the service.

 

160. Taken together and in aggregate, the allegations proved are more serious.

 

161. Allegation 5 adds little to the overall seriousness.

 

162. We conclude that the overall conduct found falls short of justifying immediate dismissal without notice. Overall, we make a finding of misconduct.

 

Outcome

 

163. Following the panel’s remarks at the end of stage three of the hearing process, the parties addressed us further.

 

VAWG / sexual impropriety

 

164. The AA urged that our finding that this as not a case of VAWG was in error. We returned to the Guidance on Outcomes. We noted that the term”… refers to acts of violence or abuse that are known to disproportionately affect women and girls.”

 

165. We accept that at first blush, the allegations have something of the flavour of sexual impropriety and / or VAWG. We returned to the facts as we had found them.

 

166. We acknowledge that the distinction may be slender but in the case of Allegation 4, we found that Witness B suffered unwanted flirtation that crossed the line of appropriateness and, indeed, into offensiveness. It was not (on the facts that we found) a case of violence or abuse. On the balance of probability, we concluded that the benefit of the doubt went to the Officer. In any event, having regard to all of the other factors we found (for and against the Officer), we concluded that if we had found that this was a case in which the term was engaged that it would have increased seriousness to the extent of having an impact on the outcome.

 

167. Likewise, in the case of Allegations 1, and 3, we also found that the facts we had found fell short of truly engaging those elements of seriousness.

 

Criminal Acts

 

168. Likewise, the AA suggested that picking up a person and pulling their hair were acts that could fall within the criminal law (as matters of assault by battery). The AA “did not recognise the idea of implied consent.” We reconsidered our conclusions on that point.

 

169. We were concerned that the matters had never been charged as criminal offences but, of course, we had to have regard to the purpose of these proceedings, which is not the same as the purpose of prosecution.

 

170. However, we had regard to the event in question. Officers (off duty) were picking-up other officers (also off duty). We concluded that a reasonable person, in that situation, would think that it was the type of thing that was acceptable. However, the actions were not welcome and the Officer was wrong to have assumed that [Witness B] would have agreed to the acts, especially given that they are not of the same gender and that they did not know each other well. In the round, we concluded that the seriousness of the breach of standards was appropriately recorded by our findings of fact and that a finding of seriousness for criminal conduct was not proportionate to the purposes of these proceedings.

 

171. In any event, having regard to all of the factors, we did not think that attaching the label of criminal acts to the conduct would have elevated our overall assessment of seriousness.

 

Culpability etc.

 

172. Subject to our comments so far, representations of counsel did not alter our findings on culpability, harm, aggravating features and mitigating features (of the conduct).

 

Testimonials and other factors

 

173. We had regard to the Officer’s record of service. He had one warning (current at the relevant period) for a very different matter. That meant that the only outcome available to us was a final written warning.

 

174. The Officer presented testimonials that did him considerable credit. We had particular regard to the testimonial from his sergeant. Other testimonials presented us with a good officer who is positive and approachable, though reference was made to banter in the team (which is perhaps part of the point of this case – banter that went beyond appropriate banter).

 

175. The Officer was awarded the Starfish Award from his Chief Superintendent in 2023.

 

Length of final written warning

 

176. The AA suggested that a five-year final written warning was the least justifiable outcome. The AA dd not expand on that to set out what that additional “term” would achieve.

 

177. Our starting point was to consider whether a two-year written warning would meet the objectives of these proceedings. As part of that consideration, we considered what a longer “term” would achieve.

 

178. We had regard to the fact that the Officer was on restrictive duty for two years and four months. In that time, the Officer lost opportunities to develop his career in a number of ways. We recognised that it was a period in which the Officer would have felt under additional scrutiny.

 

179. One of the purposes of an extended written warning is to protect the Officer and the service by providing a period of monitoring of behaviour and enhanced feedback. It provides a period of “zero tolerance.” For that purpose, the period of time on restrictive duty, pending these proceedings, is highly relevant. The period so spent on restrictive duty was far in excess of the 100-day period envisaged by the Regulations for these proceedings to be concluded. Any offending conduct in that period would be gravely aggravated and the Officer (and the service) knew that very well. With a two-year “term,” the Officer would experience a total period of enhanced scrutiny of four years and four months.

 

180. We also had regard to the fact that the outcome should reflect the gravity of the offending conduct. That is not a matter of punishment, rather a matter of public confidence in policing – the public rightly expect misconduct to be taken seriously and treated seriously. Sanctions that fail in that regard will reduce public confidence in policing.

 

181. In the context of that purpose also, the period on restrictive is also relevant. The Officer has not only undergone that extended period of enhanced scrutiny, but it will also have held back his career considerably. Without diminishing the importance of a final written warning, a period on restricted duties pending conduct proceedings has serious consequences for the Officer.

 

182. Having regard to the impact of the extended period of restrictive duties, we concluded that the public would be satisfied that the conduct found proven, to the extent that it was proven, was dealt with proportionately by these proceedings.

 

183. We concluded that a two-year final written warning was the minimum available outcome meeting the seriousness of the conduct found proven and the purpose of these proceedings.

 

Publication

184. The AA is directed to publish the final report in a format that complies with the anonymity order provided to [Witness A] and [Witness B]. The officer is to be named.

 

Appeal

 

185. All officers have a right of appeal to a Police Appeals Tribunal against any disciplinary finding and/or disciplinary outcome imposed at a misconduct hearing or a finding of gross misconduct and/or any disciplinary outcome imposed. The grounds of appeal for matters dealt with under the Conduct regulations are:

 

1. That the finding or disciplinary action imposed was unreasonable,

 

1. That there is evidence that could not reasonably have been considered at the misconduct hearing which could have materially affected the finding or decision on disciplinary action or,

 

 

1. That there was a breach of procedures set out in the Conduct regulations or other unfairness which could have materially affected the finding or decision on disciplinary action.

 

Where an officer wishes to appeal, they will need to give notice in writing to their local policing body. The notice must be given within ten working days, beginning with the first working day after the police officer is first supplied with a written copy of the decision they are appealing against.

 

        That concluded the proceedings before the Panel.

 

 

The Panel

01/03/2026

 

R v Dossi (1918) 13 Cr App R 158

R v Pritchett and another [2007] EWCA Crim 586

R v Robson [1992] Crim LR 655, CA