Former PC Alexandra Nicolaou
Chair's determination
1. Regulation 63(3) states that the former officer must be informed of the finding of the Accelerated Case Hearing and any disciplinary action imposed under Regulation 62(1) or any action taken under Regulation 62(8) as soon as practicable after receiving a report from the In any event the Chair should provide the Appropriate Authority with the report within 5 working days (beginning with the first working day after the completion of the Accelerated Case Hearing).
2. This is my report.
Finding
3. I have read the evidential bundle and seen the material I have listened carefully to all the evidence presented in the hearing. This matter has met the criteria to be presented at an Accelerated Conduct Hearing.
4. In making my determinations I have had due regard to the following documents and referred to these as necessary:
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- The Police (Conduct) Regulations (2020) which also set out the Standards of Professional Behaviour
- College of Policing guidance on outcomes in Police misconduct proceedings
- Home Office Guidance Conduct, Efficiency and Effectiveness: Statutory Guidance on Professional Standards, Performance, and Integrity in Policing (2020)
5. I have listened carefully to the case presented on behalf of the Appropriate Authority by Mr S.Thomas and also listened carefully to the representations made by Mr M.Hynes on behalf of the former officer.
6. The Legally Qualified Person at the hearing was Mr M.Thomas, who read relevant legal advice into the record, with both parties having the opportunity to make submissions on any advice provided.
7. The allegations are:
Allegation 1
On 7 June 2022 between approximately 10.30pm and 11pm whilst off-duty, the former officer unlawfully accessed the BCH police WebStorm computer system without a policing purpose and not in the course of her duties. The former officer stated in a WhatsApp message that she “Just put [the] logs up so I can see what is going on around the county.”
On 7 June 2022 at 10.30pm, the former officer disclosed sensitive police data to Mr A by sending him a photograph of her police laptop which was displaying WebStorm ‘Active Calls’ for an area of Hertfordshire. Details of nine incident logs, unrelated to Mr A, were visible with the log number, nature of the incident, names of reporting parties and addresses.
In one instance, a wanted person’s full name, address and date of birth is visible. There was no policing purpose or reasonable justification for sending this data to Mr A.
The former officer knew that her above actions were unlawful or amounted to a breach of the professional standards, as she immediately sent a further message to Mr A saying “Don’t show no one that! Il get the sack x”
Allegation 2
On 16 June 2022, between approximately 7.30pm to 10.30pm, the former officer unlawfully accessed records held on WebStorm and Athena police systems without a policing purpose. The former officer searched for, and accessed, nine police records relating to incidents and criminal investigations that involved Mr A between 2019 and 2022.
On 31 July 2026, following trial at Peterborough Crown Court, the former officer was convicted of a S.1 Computer Misuse Act Offence in relation to her actions on 16 June 2022.
The former officer’s conduct above breaches the following BCH policies:
- BCH14/009 Data Protection Policy and Procedure
- BCH16/002 Authorised Use of Classified Information Procedure
- BCH16/009 Access Control Policy
8. The AA submits that that the matters set out above, individually, or collectively, amount to gross misconduct and are so serious as to justify dismissal.
9. The AA submits that the former officer breached the following Standards of Professional Behaviour as set out in Regulation 5, and Schedule 2 to the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020, namely:
- Confidentiality
- Orders & Instructions
- Discreditable Conduct
Finding of facts
10. In all my considerations the standard of proof under which I am working is that of ‘more likely than not’ (balance of probabilities).
11. The burden of proof rests on the Appropriate
12. The former officer’s Regulation 54 response confirms their acknowledgement that a conviction for a criminal offence is a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour.
13. No further admissions are made within the Regulation
14. The former officer did not attend the hearing and with parties agreement, the hearing commenced, satisfied that the former officer was fully aware of the hearing taking place and had elected not to attend, having instructed those representing them.
15. The former officer’s regulation 54 response states:
a) She accepts undertaking the searches;
b) The conviction should not be considered in a vacuum and must be assessed in the context of the domestic abuse experienced by the former officer, including the circumstances in which she was working substantially alone, without direct supervision and, at times, from her home address;
c) Of central importance is the former officer’s relationship with Mr A. She says that he was abusive, controlling, and coercive, exploiting her vulnerability. The former officer’s case is that he took her money and, when the relationship deteriorated, sought to discredit her and destroy her policing career through vexatious complaints;
d) That context is particularly significant given the former officer’s existing vulnerability: she had MS, impaired cognitive functioning, and had already been restricted from operational policing duties.
16. With regards to allegation 1, this is proven on the balance of probability.
17. I note the former officer’s working arrangements at this time were irregular – she worked from home and the witness statement from a police sergeant in the Hertfordshire Police victim service team, confirms that the former officer occasionally worked outside of duty hours, despite being repeatedly told not
18. I find that, having accessed the WebStorm system, the former officer sent a photograph of her police laptop to Mr A which displayed nine incident logs unrelated to him and showed log numbers, the nature of the incident and the names of reporting parties and addresses. The photograph shows that, in one instance, a wanted person’s full name, address and date of birth is I find that the former officer did share the information in the way alleged and there was no policing purpose for sending that information to the third party.
19. I am satisfied that the former officer knew that her actions amounted to a breach of the Police officers receive training on the importance of managing information and data security and I note from within the evidential bundle, the former officer completed refresher training in this regard in March 2021. In addition, the former officer sent a message to Mr A stating “Don’t show no one that! Il get the sack x.”
20. In relation to allegation 2, this is proven on the balance of
21. I have read and considered the evidence, including that of police staff, dated 5th July 2023, exhibiting their auditors report. I am satisfied that the former officer accessed nine police records relating to incidents and criminal investigations related to Mr A between 2019 and 2022.
22. The former officer offered no, or no satisfactory, explanation as to why she was accessing the relevant records. They related to her then partner and were not linked to her work. The former officer knew, or should have known, that it is unacceptable to access police records relating to a partner.
23. I note the unauthorised use of systems warning that the former officer would have seen and had to have accepted before accessing the above data – therein officers are warned “accessing or disclosing police information for purposes other than in connection with your work is a disciplinary offence and may also be a criminal offence”
24. I find on the balance of probabilities, the allegations proven and the former officer’s actions in this regard were a breach of the standards of professional behaviour, with the following standards engaged: Confidentiality, Orders & Instructions and Discreditable Conduct.
Seriousness
25. It falls to me to consider the seriousness of the former officer’s
26. I have been invited to consider the four-stage process set out in the College of Policing Guidance on outcomes in misconduct proceedings, insofar as it assists me in deciding whether the matter amounts to gross misconduct or not, although the parties would have further opportunity to address me on the component parts of the four-stage process if my conclusion is that the conduct amounts to gross misconduct.
27. My reasons in this regard will therefore be open to further refinement should I need to consider outcome.
28. In considering the former officer’s culpability I find that their misconduct was deliberate and intentional and they could and should reasonably foresee the risks of I find that the former officer’s actions had the potential to damage public confidence.
29. I also note the Guidance on Outcomes which states;
Paragraph 4.34: “Misuse of policing computer systems or confidential police information more generally is a particular concern for the police service. Police computer and manual systems hold a significant amount of information about members of the public. Most of this is sensitive, and it is both a public expectation and a legal requirement that information obtained during the course of policing duties should be treated in strictest confidence, properly protected and used only for legitimate policing purposes.”
Paragraph 4.35: “If an officer is accessing police information not available to the general public, there should always be a specific and proper policing purpose for doing so.”
30. I assess culpability as high.
31. I then considered the harm of the former officer’s
32. The reputational harm to policing is clear when there is unauthorised access to data held on police systems and in this case a wanted person’s details were Police have extremely privileged authority and access to sensitive data and the public are entitled to expect officers to act with unremitting care in this regard. Trust and confidence would be harmed if they knew that police officers accessed and or shared their data for no policing purpose or personal gain, and it is this principle of trust and confidence that policing by consent relies upon.
33. The Guidance requires that police misconduct is always taken seriously when it undermines discipline and good order even if it does not result in harm to an individual victim.
34. There is currently national concern regarding police misconduct and the handling of information by the police.
35. I assess harm as high
36. In respect of aggravating factors, I am careful not to double count matters considered above.
37. I find that the former officer realised or should have realised their conduct was
38. The former officer’s conduct was a significant deviation from instructions and force policy.
39. There are 3 standards of professional behaviour
40. The evidence did not show that the former officer raised concerns or sought advice from colleagues or senior officers in relation to the misuse of systems.
41. In relation to mitigation, I recognise the former officer’s misconduct appears to be confined to a three-month period of time.
42. I recognise the former officer was working at home with limited active
43. Taking all of the above into account, I find that the conduct in question was so serious that it could justify dismissal. I therefore find that the former officer’s conduct amounts to gross misconduct and engaged the three standards of professional conduct, alleged.
Outcome
44. I am grateful for the submissions received from both the Authority and the former officer on outcome. I have considered them with care and have taken them into account when making my decision on outcome.
45. I give regard to the former officer’s record of police service and I do acknowledge their contribution to policing, as described within that record.
46. In making my decision on outcome I adopt the three-stage process, as outlined in the College of Policing’s Guidance on Outcomes in Police Misconduct Proceedings to determine the appropriate sanction.
47. The first stage is to assess the seriousness of the conduct. This is assessed by reference to:
i) The former officer’s culpability,
ii) The harm caused by the misconduct
iii) The existence of aggravating factors
iv) The existence of mitigating factors
48. The second stage is to keep in mind the purpose of the police misconduct regime. I remind myself that this has three elements:
i) To maintain public confidence in and the reputation of the police service,
ii) To uphold high standards and deter misconduct, and
iii) To protect the public
49. I further remind myself that the police misconduct regime is not designed to punish police officers – it is about maintaining public trust and confidence, and the reputation and standing of the profession as a whole.
50. The third stage is to choose the outcome that most appropriately fulfils that purpose given the seriousness of the conduct in question.
Stage 1: the seriousness of the conduct
Culpability/harm
51. Having considered these factors afresh, for reasons already outlined, I find both culpability and harm to be high.
52. I note the importance placed on the Guidance on Outcomes in relation to the misuse of policing computer systems or confidential police information.
Aggravating factors
53. Having already found that the former officer would or should have realised that her conduct was improper and it was a significant deviation from instructions and force policy, I remind myself that there are three standards of professional behaviour engaged in this matter, namely Confidentiality, Orders & Instructions and Discreditable Conduct.
Mitigating factors
54. In considering mitigating factors previously identified, and remaining conscious that I should not conflate statutory mitigation and personal mitigation, I go on to consider personal mitigation.
55. Personal mitigation raised on behalf of the former officer, included the fact she was working substantially alone, without direct supervision, and at times from her home address, allegations of domestic abuse within the context of VAWG, along with physical and mental health challenges.
56. In Salter v Chief Constable of Dorset [2012] EWCA Civ 1047 Maurice Kay LJ said [para 23]
“As to personal mitigation, just as an unexpectedly errant solicitor can usually refer to an unblemished past and the esteem of his colleagues, so will a police officer often be able so to do. However, because of the importance of public confidence, the potential of such mitigation is necessarily limited.”
57. In Williams v Police Appeals Tribunals [2016] EWHC 2708Holdroyde J said:
“The importance of maintaining public confidence in and respect for the police service is constant, regardless of the nature of the gross misconduct under consideration. What may vary will be the extent to which the particular gross misconduct threatens the preservation of such confidence and respect. The more it does so, the less weight can be given to personal mitigation”
58. With this in mind, I make it clear that I acknowledge the sincerity of the personal mitigation raised. I must give limited weight to it.
Conclusion on seriousness
59. With all of the above in mind, I find the conduct to be so serious it could justify dismissal and therefore record my finding of gross misconduct.
Stage 2: the purpose of the misconduct regime
60. I have reminded myself that the primary purpose of imposing disciplinary sanctions is to maintain public confidence in and the reputation of the policing profession as a This objective takes precedence over the impact that an outcome has on an individual whose misconduct is being sanctioned.
61. Home Office guidance also notes that the proceedings must be a deterrent to others, ensuring that they know that serious breaches of the Standards, will lead to significant consequences.
62. This position is supported by the judgement in Redgrave v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2003] 1 WLR 1136 at [33] that states;
“The purpose of disciplinary proceedings … is … to protect the public … and to maintain the high standards and good reputation of the honourable profession.”
and Lord Collins’s comments in R (Coke-Wallis) v Institute of Chartered Accountants [2011] UKSC at [60] where he reaffirmed the purpose of professional disciplinary proceedings to be;
“…to protect the public, to maintain public confidence in the integrity of the profession, and to uphold proper standards of behaviour[…].”
63. I acknowledge the affect that outcomes imposed can have, and accordingly, the outcome here should be one that satisfies the purpose of the
64. In deciding the appropriate outcome, I have considered less severe outcomes before more severe outcomes and I impose the outcome that deals adequately with the issues identiļ¬ed, whilst protecting the public interest.
Stage 3: the appropriate outcome
65. I have considered the former officer’s record of
66. In light of the former officer’s resignation, the former officer provisions
67. I considered least severe available outcomes
68. Outcome: My decision is that the former officer would have been dismissed if she had remained a serving police officer.
Right of appeal
69. The former officer will be notified of this outcome, in writing within 5 working days, along with their right of appeal.
70. The former officer has a right to appeal this decision in accordance with the Police Appeals Tribunal Rules If the former officer wishes to appeal, she should provide notice of intention to the Appropriate Authority within 10 working days of receipt of this written determination.
Publication of outcome
71. Pursuant to Regulation 63(5) I must require the Appropriate Authority to publish this outcome, subject to the harm test in Regulation 6 and to Regulation 63(9).
Vaughan Lukey
Assistant Chief Constable